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Abstract
We implement a risky choice experiment based on one-dimensional choice variables and
risk neutrality induced via binary lottery incentives. Each participant confronts many parameter
constellations with varying optimal payoffs. We assess (sub)optimality, as well as (non)optimal
satisficing by eliciting aspirations in addition to choices. Treatments differ in the probability
that a binary random event, which are payoff- but not optimal choice–relevant, is experimentally
induced and whether participants choose portfolios directly or via satisficing, i.e., by forming
aspirations and checking for satisficing before making their choice. By incentivizing aspiration
formation, we can test satisficing, and in cases of satisficing, determine whether it is optimal.
Keywords: (un)Bounded Rationality, Satisficing, Risk, Uncertainty, Experiments
JEL: D03; D81; C91
1 Introduction
The rational choice approach, albeit dominating (micro)economics, should be considered with cau-
tion in the real world because optimizing is often difficult: limited cognitive abilities, information
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overload and complexity will regularly lead to suboptimal decision making.1 Such regular subop-
timality renders also "rationality with errors" questionable.2 Moreover most choice situations in-
volve multiple incompatible goals that must somehow be combined to reach a decision (as in multi-
objective optimization).3
Many scholars now focus on alternative models4 and, more generally, on bounded rationality5,
such as satisficing behavior. To compare these two different strands of the literature (i.e., optimizing
versus satisficing), we implement a choice class allowing not only for unique and set-valued opti-
mality in the sense of expected utility maximization but also experimentally elicit and incentivize
aspiration formation. Although the experimental setup is framed as a financial investment task this
is only done to discourage other regarding concerns.
Our main aim in designing it has been to control the usual tool used to align rational choice pre-
dictions with choice behavior. How this can be achieved will be described when presenting the class
of experimental choice task. What can be said already now is that we do not claim external validity
for the choice tasks. Rather they were signed to allow clearcut tests of optimality as well as optimal
satisficing in consequentialistic decision making.6 Our main message is to illustrate that, even when
rationality relies on rather mild assumptions both optimality and satisficing might require experi-
ence.7 In particular, in our setting each participant confronts two random sequences of 18 different
(continuous) choice tasks whose expected success depends on a binary random event. Optimality
requires only to prefer more money to less and to find the focal (corner) maximum of the expected
success with several trials. Thus optimality can be assessed based on how choices deviate from the
(corner) optimum and how costly this is.
To avoid criticizing without providing alternatives, we also consider bounded rationality based
1See Buchanan and Kock (2001) on information overload issues.
2For an example of this literature, see Hey and Orme (1994), Hey (1995), Loomes and Sugden (1995), and Harless
and Camerer (1994), among others.
3Marley (1997).
4See, among others, Savikhin (2013) on financial analysis and risk management.
5See, for instance, Selten et al. (2012) and Güth and Ploner (2016)
6Consequentialist bounded rationality assumes that choosing among alternatives by anticipating their likely impli-
cations requires causal relationships linking the choice (means) and determinants beyond one’s control, such as chance
events, to the relevant outcome variables (ends).
7Note that this kind of experimental analysis can shed light on mental modeling and – more generally – on cognitive
processes, in addition to eliciting the usual choice data.
2
on consequentialist choice deliberations and satisficing rather than optimizing. Instead of reacting
to given and well-behaved preferences and beliefs about circumstances beyond their control, partic-
ipants are asked to form goal aspirations and then successively test behavioral options to determine
whether they are satisficing these aspirations before making a choice. From a methodological per-
spective this means that we do not rely on the revealed aspiration approach for empirical economics.
Whereas "revealed motives" presuppose satisficing (respectively optimizing) eliciting aspirations in
addition to choice data allows to test satisficing. 8
In our setup, the realization of a binary chance event is beyond our control either "boom" (good
outcome) or "doom" (bad outcome) circumstances result. Abstaining from imposing intrapersonal
payoff aggregation as in expected utility and prospect theory (by aggregating the probability-weighted
choice implications in boom and doom), means that participants form goal aspirations for boom and
doom scenarios. When satisficing, one chooses a portfolio whose returns in boom, respectively
doom, satisfy both aspirations. This does not rule out optimality as a border case: set-valued op-
timal satisficing requires that it is impossible to increase the aspiration for boom or doom without
reducing the other. Such set optimality does not require probabilities of boom and doom, which are
partly not experimentally induced.9 Even when probabilities are experimentally induced, they may
not be used for intrapersonal payoff aggregation but in forming and adapting aspiration levels, for
instance, by forming more ambitious (moderate) aspirations for the more (less) likely event.
A portfolio choice may be either satisficing (but not set optimal) or non-satisficing. In an experi-
ment, one can confirm a portfolio choice even when it is not satisficing. According to our interpreta-
tion, satisficing is based on a forward-looking decision-making process involving several successive
steps for the task at hand, aspiration formation and searching for satisficing options in the action
space, with possible feedback loops in light of new information. We experimentally compare partic-
ipants who are forced to reason according to this structure before deciding to participants who are
allowed to decide freely, that is, without having to form aspirations. We neither predicted optimality
8From the seminal contribution of Simon (1955) to contributions in mathematics (see Kunreuther and Krantz, 2007)
and psychology (Kruglanski 1996 and Kruglanski et al. 2002), as well as to the literature on the role of mental models in
decision making (Gary and Wood, 2010), this approach has increasingly contaminated economics (Camerer 1991, Pearl
2003 and Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001), although not always beyond lip service.
9One essentially employs a multiple selves approach that does not require intrapersonal payoff aggregation.
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nor optimal satisficing and we expected even considerable non-satisficing choices that will become
less frequent when participants become more experienced that would illustrate how experience can
improve behavior.
Section 2 introduces the 18 choice tasks, or cases, and derives their optimal choices or choice sets.
We then discuss the hypotheses in Section 3. The treatments and other details of the experimental
protocol are described in Section 4. Sections 5 presents the results on (sub)optimality as pairwise
comparisons of treatments; Section 6 focuses on satisficing and its statistical analysis, while Section
7 refers to special cases in the data. Section 8 concludes. The appendices include additional data
analysis and the translated instructions of the experiment.
2 The choice class
To induce risk neutrality, participants earn, in addition to their show-up fee, either e4 or e14, i.e.,
we implement binary lottery incentives. In doing so, we are not troubled by doubtful evidence 10 (see
Selten et al., 1999) that such incentives imply risk neutrality. When testing expected utility theory,
one presupposes that "binary lottery incentives work". Specifically, participants should maximize
via their portfolio choice the probability of receiving e14 rather than e4, what assumes:
Assumption 1 Participants prefer more money, e14, to less, e4.
When describing the choice class, the financial portfolio selection frame, used in the instructions,
does not claim external validity, i.e. to capture portfolio choice problems in the field. The choice
class is designed to induce, for example, risk neutrality and to render the probabilities for boom and
doom irrelevant for optimal choice. Furthermore, by framing the decision tasks as portfolio choices
we try to strengthen the purely individual choice consequences, i.e., to discourage other-regarding
concerns.
In each choice task an endowment (of a positive amount) e can be invested in a risk-free bond
with a constant repayment rate c (≥ 0) or in a risky asset. The repayment rate of the risky asset is
10Of course, one may object that risk attitude can be interpreted much more broadly than captured by curvature of
utility-of-money curves, e.g. via probability transformation. Again this we can say that most of other risk aspects seem to
also play no or at best a minor role in our setup.
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r(i) with probability p, where r(i) depends on the amount i invested in the risky asset, or it is 0 with
probability (1 − p), where 0 < p < 1. We refer to the (1 − p)-probability event when i is lost as
doom and to the p-probability event as boom, where the return from i is r(i) · i. We let r(i) depend
linearly on i via r(i) = e− i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ e.
P (i) denotes the expected probability of earning e14 rather than e4. For the expected utility
of choice i, namely, E(i) = [1− P (i)]u(e4) + P (i)u(e14)), setting u(e4) = 0 and u(e14) =
1 based on Assumption 1 implies that E(i) = P (i), i.e., the expected utility of choice i is the
probability that choice i implies for earning e14.
Now the return from investing i in the risky asset and e− i in the safe bond is (e− i)c in case of
doom and (e− i)(c+ i) in case of boom. Since P (i) is restricted to 0 ≤ P (i) ≤ 1, expected utility
is given by:
P (i) = (1− p) ·min {1, (e− i)c}+ p ·min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} (1)
Across all cases, one has (e− i)c < 1 via ec < 1 due to (e− i)(c+ i) ≤ 1. Thus, the constrained
optimization tasks require us to determine the i level(s) for which
P (i) = (1− p)(e− i)c+ p ·min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} (2)
is maximal. Solving the unconstrained maximization of
P ◦(i) = (1− p)(e− i)c+ p(e− i)(c+ i) (3)
yields i◦ = pe−c2p , exceeding, for all cases with c > 0, the smallest i level for which (e − i)(c + i)
equals 1 11, namely,
i∗ =
e− c
2
−
√
(e+ c)2 − 4
2
(4)
Assumption 2 12One can determine for c > 0 the lowest i level i∗ withmin {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} = 1.
11see Table 1 presenting the optimal predictions
12To justify Assumption 2 participants can consider 6 options i by moving a slider displaying P (i) =
min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} and P (i) = (e − i)c before making their choice, as it will be explained in the Experimental
Protocol section
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We define P (i) = min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} and P (i) = (e− i)c. P (i) is the column height for boom
and P (i) for doom that participants can see as resulting from a chosen slider position.
For all i levels above i∗, especially for i◦, one can reduce i and, as c > 0, improve the chances
of earning e14 in the doom case without reducing the chances of earning e14 with probability 1 in
the boom case, as illustrated in the left diagram of Figure 1 with two curves representing P (i) and
P (i). The left diagram in Figure 1 highlights that when lowering i from i = e one first improves
both success probabilities, P (i) and P (i).Then when P (i) is constrained to 1, respectively 100%,
only P (i) is still increasing whereas P (i) = 1 when i is further decreased. Only when i < i∗
one faces conflicting concerns P (i) and P (i): reducing i in this range one favors P (i) at the cost
of P (i). The right diagram of Figure 1 tries to visualize the geometry of optimality and optimal
satisficing. It presents five different curves: the two strictly concave curves both neglecting the
constraint P (i) = min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} of which the upper is the unconstrained boom payoff
(e−i)(c+i) and the lower is the unconstrained payoffP ◦(i) in equation (3). The other curves display
the success probability P (i) for the boom (flat top), P (i) (linear) for the doom, already contained in
the left diagram. Finally the probability-weighted sum P (i), P (i) and P (i) is piecewise linear and
concave, and shows the expected success P (i) of choice i in equation (2) whose corner maximum
is i∗, and the lowest i level with P (i) = 1. Whereas optimality requires unambiguously the choice
of i∗, optimal satisficing only excludes i-choices with i > i∗: all i-choices in the range 0 ≤ i ≤ i∗
do not allow to increase either P (i) or P (i) without reducing the other.
Proposition 1 For c > 0, the optimal unique investment is given by i∗ in equation (4), which does
not depend on p.
For c = 0, there exist no chances in doom to win e14 rather than e4, as P (i) = (e − i)c = 0.
Thus, also for c = 0 probability p is not optimal-choice relevant and the problem of intra-personal
payoff aggregation does not arise. If c = 0 and e = 2, the unique optimal choice is i∗ = 1 so that
i∗
e = 1/2, often referred to as "Golden Mean". When c = 0 and e > 2, all investment choices i
∗ in
the range
e− c
2
−
√
e2 − 4
2
≤ i ≤ e− c
2
+
√
e2 − 4
2
(5)
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are optimal.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates that P (i) = 1 and P (i) = p · max {1, (e− i)i} = p are flat in
that range. For e = 2, the flat interval degenerates to a single tangential point with (e − i∗)i∗ = 1.
Figure 2, based on two (of the three) c = 0 cases with e = 2 and e = 4, displays the curves P (i) for
e = 2 with P (i) = 1 just for i∗ = 1 as well as for e = 4 with a wide range of optimal investments i∗
in the generic interval (see equation 5). Of course, the P (i)- curves for both cases would represent
P (i) = pP (i) would be linear but display the same curvature.
Proposition 2 For c = 0, the point and set values optimality coincide and predict a unique choice
for e = 2 but a generic interval prediction (equation 5) for e > 2.
Figure 1: Illustration of payoff incentives P (i), P (i), P (i)
Notes: p = c = 0.4 and e = 2 yield a similar graph for all p, c > 0 and e ≥ 2 such that 0 < i∗ < i◦ < e−c
2
< e
2
.
We extend Assumption 2 to c = 0 as follows:
Assumption 3 Participants can determine some i-level with P (i) = 1 when c = 0.
Given that participants can use the slider repeatedly, this does not seem unrealistic for e > 2 when
the interval (equation 5) is generic. However, even for e = 2, the unique optimal choice i∗ = 1 may
be found after some experience.
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Figure 2: Illustration of payoff incentives P (i) when c = 0 and e = 2 or 4
Notes: For e = 2 and e = 4.
The (sets of) optimal i∗ choices for all parameter constellations, referred to as cases, are listed
in Table 3. When generating the parameter constellations confronted by participants, we wanted to
include rather large and small probabilities p, although the numerical probability p does not affect
the optimal choice i∗. The advantage of our setting is that optimality can be achieved via the heuristic
of determining the smallest i level guaranteeing P (i) = 1 by repeatedly using the slider provided
by the software (see the decision screens in Figures 9 and 10 in Appendix B and their explanation in
the instructions in Appendix A).
3 Hypotheses
Each participant confronts all 18 different parameter constellations (twice) in two successive random
orders. We refer to the first random sequence of 18 cases as phase 1 and to the second as phase 2.
For (sub) optimality, one could predict symmetry 13 , as well as a decline with experience.
13In the spirit of Fechner’s (1876) law for visual distance perception, symmetry could be questioned by concavity
in perceiving numerical success for all numerical goals, irrespective whether the goals are monetary or probabilities of
earninge14 rather thane4. Rather than risk aversion postulating a concave utility of money, in our context, the concavely
perceived numerical goal would be the probability of earninge14, which suggests more i choices below rather than above
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Hypothesis 1 (Symmetry and Learning Hypothesis): The observed i choices are more symmetri-
cally distributed below and above i∗ the closer q∗ = i∗e is to 1/2 with a variance of i − i∗ or
q − q∗ = iq − i
∗
q being smaller in phase 2.
We do not analyze sub-optimality via "rationality in making mistakes" meaning that mistakes (here,
deviations of i from i∗) with higher losses – compared to optimality – are less likely. In our view,
rationality in committing errors is questionable as it presupposes an awareness of what one loses.14
For c > 0 for the concept of satisficing, aspiration formation means specifying an aspired prob-
ability
(1) A for P (i) = min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)}
(2) A(≤ A) for P (i) = (e− i)c when the risky investment is lost.
Since (e− i)(c+ i) can partly exceed 1 for generic i intervals, in these intervals, one can decrease
the i level and increase P (i) for c > 0 without questioning P (i) = min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} = 1. In
the terminology of satisficing, one can form a higher doom aspiration, A, without having to reduce
the boom aspiration, A.
Across all 15 cases with c > 0, the optimal choice i∗ is the right corner of the interval from 0
to i∗ of all i choices that are set optimal in the sense that it is impossible to increase P (i) without
reducing P (i), and vice versa. Using the slider generates column heights indicating the probabilities
of earning e14 in the boom and doom cases, which a participant has to translate into numerical
success probabilities. This might cause problems when considering i choices suggesting probability
aspirations for e14 below 1 that, however, only apply to set-optimal choices i, with i < i∗ for c > 0.
For i choices that guarantee earning e14 with probability 1, the translation of column heights into
numerical aspirations A = 1 should matter less.
If a choice i with 0 ≤ i ≤ e is guaranteeing P (i) ≥ A, as well as P (i) ≥ A, we say that i is
satisficing (A,A). Furthermore, we speak of optimal satisficing if neither A nor A can be increased
i∗.
14Nevertheless, concepts relying on “rational mistakes” are often used to account for empirical, mostly experimentally
observed, behavior, e.g., Quantal Response (Equilibrium) estimates (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), but also in game theory,
e.g., in case of the "intuitive criterion" (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and "properness" (Myerson, 1978).
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without questioning such satisficing. For c > 0, optimal satisficing excludes any choice i yielding
(e− i)(c+ i) > 1: if i > i∗ := e−c2 −
√
(e+c)2−4
2 , one can increase P (i) by a lower i in the range
i∗ ≤ i without questioning that P (i) = 1. Since for the 15 cases with c > 0 one has e ≥ 2 and,
thus, (e + c)2 > 4, the term
√
(e+ c)2 − 4 is positive across all c > 0 cases: set optimality in the
sense of optimal satisficing requires 0 ≤ i ≤ i∗ for c > 0 (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
The set-optimal choices i and aspiration profiles (A,A)withA ≥ A are thus given by 0 ≤ i ≤ i∗,
A = P (i) = 1 andA = P (i) = c(e− i). This set definition of optimally satisficing choices i and of
optimal aspiration profiles (A,A) does not pay any attention to probability p. Rather than weighting
cases (1) and (2) by probabilities and aggregating their probability-weighted success, the decision
maker is concerned with two alter egos, only one of which would be rewarded for risky investment.
For the three c = 0 cases, the doom scenarios has P (i) = 0 for all i with 0 ≤ i ≤ e. Thus,
one should only aspire A = 0, which avoids intra-personal payoff aggregation. As a consequence,
the sets of utility-maximizing and optimally satisficing choices coincide with the point prediction
i∗ = (e−c)2 for e = 2 and the set prediction
e−c
2 −
√
(e+c)2−4
2 ≤ i∗ ≤ e−c2 +
√
(e+c)2−4
2 for e > 2.
Table 1 provides an overview of the optimality predictions based on expected utility maximization
or optimal satisficing, i.e., optimal aspiration formation and choice making.
Table 1: Optimality predictions
cases optimal investment optimal satisficing
in investing in aspiration formation
c > 0 e ≥ 2 i∗ = e−c
2
−
√
(e+c)2−4
2
0 ≤ i ≤ i∗ A = min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)} ;A = (e− i)c
c = 0 e = 2 i∗ = 1 i∗ = 1 A = 1;A = 0
e > 2 e−c
2
−
√
(e+c)2−4
2
≤ i∗ ≤ i e−c
2
+
√
(e+c)2−4
2
A = 1;A = 0
Notes: Optimality predictions for investing and aspiration formation based on expected utility maximization (left column) and optimal
satisficing (middle, and right columns).
The set of satisficing choices and aspiration profiles in the sense of A ≤ P (i) and A ≤ P (i)
becomes empty when aspirations are too ambitious, whereas when aspirations are moderate, the set
is rather large. In view of previous experiences (Güth et al., 2009), aspiration formation was incen-
tivized by paying for aspirations only when satisficing them; no payment was received otherwise.
Thus, a participant with an aspiration profile (A,A) and choice i earns e14
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• in case (1), with probability A if P (i) ≥ A and zero probability otherwise
• in case (2), with probability A if P (i) ≥ A and zero probability otherwise
where 0 probability of earning e14 means earning e4 with probability 1. Incentivizing satisficing
in this seemingly cruel way (we later on refer toA ≥ P (i) or A ≥ P (i) as "economic suicide")
arguably increases the cognitive load in the satisficing treatments with three payoff relevant choices,
namely i, A and A instead of only one. But then neither optimality concept appeals to this cognitive
load which it implies. But because of cognitive load we predict only satisficing but not its optimality.
Hypothesis 2 (Non-Optimal Satisficing): Participants learn to satisfice, but aspiration profiles (A,A)
are, at least initially, non-optimal, i.e., one could increase either A or A without having to decrease
the other. Furthermore, many i choices will not be set optimal in the sense of optimally satisficing
choices.
We predicted some "burning money" in the sense of small positive differences in P (i)−A and
P (i)− A. Compared to "burning money", we predicted significantly less evidence of "committing
suicide" which occurs whenA > P (i) orA > P (i). This means that the chance of earning 14 is lost
when earning A · δ(P (i) ≥ A) or A · δ(P (i) ≥ A) in the boom and doom cases, respectively, with
δ(·) denoting the indicator function that takes the value 1 if its condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise.
When a probability 0 < p < 1 is experimentally induced, a participant might use it for intra-
personal payoff aggregation or for aspiration formation and adjustment (see Sauermann and Selten,
1962). The latter could mean to be more ambitious in the more likely case (1) or (2), e.g., by in-
creasing the respective aspiration level, A or A.
Hypothesis 3 (Probability-Use Hypothesis): Participants will react mainly qualitatively to infor-
mation about the probability p when choosing or forming aspirations.
When participants are not informed of the probability p, they are partly asked to generate a sub-
jective probability pˆ = 1/2, e.g., p = 1/2 due to the principle of insufficient reason. However,
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pˆ 6= p does not change i∗ and does not call into question the optimality predictions in Table 3. Ex-
periences with and without experimentally induced prior probabilities, to the best of our knowledge,
have found few differences in their choice data.
4 Experimental protocols
The four between subjects treatments implemented in the experiment (T1,T2, T3 and T4) rely on
the 2 × 2 factorial design, choice format and probability information, presented in Table 2. These
treatments differ in whether probability p is experimentally induced (T1 and T3) and on whether
only the choice i (T1 and T2) or aspirations (A,A) and choicei are elicited (T3 and T4).
Table 2: The 2× 2-factorial between subjects treatments
Choice Format Probability Information
p given p unknown
I-treatment T1: i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6 T2: first pˆ
(direct i-choice) then. i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6
 final choice of i  final choice of i
S-treatment T3: first. A,A T4: first A,A
(first aspiration profiles then i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6 then i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6
then i-choice)  final choice of i  final choice of i
For each treatment, we conducted three sessions with student participants recruited from Luiss
University from different fields of study (mainly economics, law and political science) using Orsee
software (Greiner, 2015). The number of participants per treatment varied from 71 to 78. Over-
all, we employed a total of 302 participants. The experiment was fully computerized using Z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes. After each session, participants
answered a brief questionnaire, mainly to collect demographic information, before being privately
paid in cash for a randomly selected round. No one participated in more than one session.
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4.1 Choice tasks
At the beginning of each round each subject was endowed with an amount of money that could be
allocated in two kinds of investment: a risk-free bond with constant repayment factor, independent
of the market condition, and a risky asset whose repayment factor changed with the market condition
and the amount invested in it. The market could be in good or bad conditions whose probabilities (p
and (1− p), respectively) were communicated in each round in T1 and T3 but were unknown in T2
and T4.
In all treatments, the allocation choices did not affect directly the potential earning. They only
affected the probability or earninge14 instead ofe4. In each round, before making the final decision
on howmuch to invest in the risky asset (i), subjects could try and visualize the effects of own choices
on the probability of earning e14 in the two different market conditions by scrolling the cursor on
the bar. The subjects had several attempts before the final one. They could move the cursor at most
6 times (the number of attempts, as well as the time elapsed in each round were clearly shown in the
screenshots).
In T3 and T4, in each round before the investment choice, subjects were asked to state the proba-
bility of earning e14 instead of e4 that would make them satisfied, both for market in good and bad
condition separately. These satisficing probability could be modified only once in each round. The
comparison between their level and the probability of earning e14 or e4 implied by the investment
choice determined the final potential earning, as it will be explained in 4.3.
4.2 Parameters constellations
The 18 cases in Table 3 were constructed by neglecting that P (i) cannot exceed 1 and imposing
P ◦(i◦) = (1 − p)(e − i◦)c + p(e − i◦)(c + i◦) = (e − i◦)(c + pi◦) = 0.9 for the unconstrained
optimal choice i◦ across all cases. The actual optimal expected success probability, due to P (i) ≤ 1,
varies considerably (see P (i∗) in Table 3), namely, from 0.23 to 0.9. The cases are defined by the
endowment e and the i◦/e-investment share of the unconstrained optimal investment i◦. Together,
these determine the parameters p and c when imposing P (i◦) = 0.9.
The different parameter constellations include the "Golden Mean", i.e. i∗ = e/2, with c = 0 and
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e = 2, and exclude P (i) = (e− i)c ≥ 1 via ec < 1. Moreover, the parameter constellations capture
some rather small and at least some rather large probabilities p in the range 0 < p < 1, which are
payoff- but not optimal-choice relevant.
All participants confronted the parameter constellations twice in two successive phases, each
with 18 rounds and in a random order.
Table 3: Cases and optimal payoffs
Case e c p i∗ i◦ q◦ = i
◦
e
P (i∗) P (i∗) P (i∗)
1 2 0.00 0.90 1 1.00 6/12 0.90 1 0.00
2 2 0.22 0.66 0.41 0.83 5/12 0.78 1 0.35
3 2 0.34 0.51 0.22 0.67 4/12 0.81 1 0.60
4 2 0.40 0.40 0.14 0.50 3/12 0.85 1 0.75
5 2 0.43 0.32 0.09 0.33 2/12 0.88 1 0.82
6 2 0.45 0.27 0.07 0.17 1/12 0.90 1 0.87
7 3 0.00 0.40 0.38 1.50 6/12 0.40 1 0.00
8 3 0.15 0.29 0.21 1.25 5/12 0.59 1 0.42
9 3 0.23 0.23 0.12 1.00 4/12 0.74 1 0.66
10 3 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.75 3/12 0.83 1 0.79
11 3 0.29 0.14 0.05 0.50 2/12 0.88 1 0.86
12 3 0.30 0.12 0.04 0.25 1/12 0.90 1 0.89
13 4 0.00 0.23 0.27 2.00 6/12 0.23 1 0.00
14 4 0.11 0.17 0.15 1.67 5/12 0.52 1 0.42
15 4 0.17 0.13 0.09 1.33 4/12 0.71 1 0.67
16 4 0.20 0.10 0.05 1.00 3/12 0.81 1 0.79
17 4 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.67 2/12 0.88 1 0.87
18 4 0.22 0.07 0.03 0.33 1/12 0.88 1 0.87
4.3 Earnings
A subject could earn either e14 or e4 in addition to the show-up fee of e4. Participants are paid
for one random round selected by the computer at the end of the experiment.
In T1 and T2, earnings depended on the investment choice and the random event, whereas in T3
and T4, earnings depended on the investment choice, the random event and the aspiration levels (A,A
for winning e14). An aspiration level that did not exceed the probability of winning e14 (in either
boom or doom cases) determined the probability of winning e14. If the aspiration level exceeded
the probability of winning e14 for the i choice (in either boom or doom), the probability of winning
e14 was nil (but one receivede4 with probability 1). For an example of the payoffs in T3 and T4, see
Figure 10 in Appendix B: the boom aspiration level is 60%, lower than the probability represented
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by the left bar. The doom aspiration level is higher than the overall probability represented by the
right bar. Since p = 0.14, doom results with probability 0.86. As aspiration A exceeds the level
P (i) = (e − i)c, i.e., the chance of earning e14 in the case of doom is nil, and the probability of
earning e14 is only 0.6× 0.14 = 0.084.
5 Assessing (Sub) Optimality For c > 0
We consider each choice as an observation to test optimality in T1 and T2 as postulated by expected
utility maximization, and in T3 and T4 following optimal satisficing in investing and in forming aspi-
ration. However, when assessing the extent of suboptimality and non-optimal satisficing, one might
take into account which choices are made by the same participant and consider only the individual
averages as independent.15
Although repeated slider use should quickly reveal that increasing i in the interval from i∗ to i◦ is
suboptimal, someone solving the unconstrained optimization task analyticallymight have overlooked
this. We therefore checked (sub)optimality in view of i◦, although our main focus is, of course, the
optimal choice i∗ and the optimal interval 0 ≤ i ≤ i∗. Analyzing suboptimality across all 15 cases
with c > 0 via deviations i◦ − i across treatments T1, T2, T3, T4 and phases 1 and 2 (see Figure 11
in Appendix B) consistently reveals a positive mode, meaning that i < i◦ is more focal. This could
point in the direction of optimality, i∗. In fact, (see Figure 3) the modes of the deviations i− i∗ from
optimality are close to 0 for all treatments (the much longer tails in the range i > i∗ are due to i∗e
usually being small in the unit interval).
In the action space, we compare actual investments with optimal ones aggregated across all 15
cases of either phase 1 or phase 2, as well as for all 30 i choices with c > 0 across treatments (see
Figure 3). Some will be discussed in more detail via pairwise comparisons of treatments. What we
observe so far is a tighter distribution around i∗ and stronger experience from phase 1 to 2 for T1
and T2.16
15Wewill often employ both possibilities by reporting significance levels based on each choice and individual averages,
with the latter in brackets.
16Figure 11 in Appendix B shows the difference between the actual investment choice (i) and the unconstrained optimal
investment (i◦).
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Figure 3: Deviation i∗ − i by Phase and Treatment
Notes: Kernel density function for cases with c > 0.
Table 4 displays the average i choices, as well as their frequencies and % shares for i ≤ i∗,
i∗ < i ≤ i◦ and i > i◦. The share of set-optimal i choices (i < i∗) is considerably larger in T1
and T2. Treatments T3 and T4 asking for aspirations A and A fare worse. Specifically, the share
of i choices with i > i◦ is much higher in T3 and T4 than in T1 and T2. It seems that incentivized
aspiration formation crowds out rather than promotes better decision making. Note the low shares
of i choices in the interval i ≤ i∗ even though the number of choices in this interval increases
considerably from phase 1 to phase 2, especially in T1 and T2.
The influence of q∗ = i∗/e is demonstrated in Table 5, which distinguishes between cases with
q∗ ≤ 0.1 and 0.1 < q∗ ≤ 0.5. For all four treatments, the share of i choices with i ≤ i∗ is
always larger when q∗ exceeds 0.1, i.e., the direction of deviation from the optimal choice i∗ is
mainly determined by the lengths of the q = i/e intervals to the left and right of i∗/e. However,
16
Table 4: Average level i by restricted and unrestricted optimal investment intervals
i ≤ i∗ i∗ < i ≤ i◦ i > i◦
i obs % i obs % i obs %
T1 Phase 1 0.060 369 31.54 0.323 480 41.03 1.366 321 27.44
Phase 2 0.058 532 45.47 0.260 450 38.46 1.195 188 16.07
T2 Phase 1 0.086 292 25.04 0.424 694 59.52 1.383 180 15.44
Phase 2 0.076 422 36.38 0.321 622 53.62 1.128 116 10.00
T3 Phase 1 0.076 176 15.64 0.417 413 36.71 1.369 536 47.64
Phase 2 0.068 207 18.40 0.378 431 38.31 1.295 487 43.29
T4 Phase 1 0.114 164 15.40 0.400 373 35.02 1.431 528 49.58
Phase 2 0.107 158 14.84 0.323 452 42.44 1.527 455 42.72
Notes: Average for 15 cases where c > 0.
Table 5: Average level i by restricted and unrestricted optimal investment intervals and by q∗ levels
q Low q High
T1 T2 T3 T4 T1 T2 T3 T4
i ≤ i∗ i-mean 0.034 0.055 0.042 0.064 0.193 0.171 0.201 0.203
% 37.43 27.69 15.95 11.59 45.51 50.16 24.00 38.03
i∗ < i ≤ i◦ i-mean 0.272 0.372 0.386 0.341 0.472 0.421 0.488 0.482
% 41.22 60.69 38.56 39.54 30.13 29.90 30.67 33.45
i > i◦ i-mean 1.329 1.388 1.356 1.505 1.154 0.884 1.189 1.150
% 21.35 11.61 45.94 48.86 24.36 19.94 45.33 28.52
Obs. 2028 2015 1950 1846 312 311 300 284
Notes: Average results for the 15 cases with c > 0 when q∗ ≤ 0.10 is Low, and 0.10 < q∗ ≤ 0.5 is High.
these shares are considerably smaller for T3 and T4 than for T1 and T2, irrespective whether q∗ is
"Low"or "High".
In the payoff space, we compare the following:
• expected payoff losses
P (i∗)− P (i) = (1− p)(e− i∗)c+ p− (1− p)(e− i)c− p ·min {1, (e− i)(c+ i)}
separately for phase 1 and 2, as well as for 30 treatments (see Figure 4) and
• separate payoff losses for boom (see Figure 12 in Appendix B) and doom (see Figure 13 in
Appendix B) in order to determine whether suboptimality is due to special concerns in either
boom or doom cases.
The payoff distributions are consistent with the i choice distributions, in particular, deviations
are closer to zero in the payoff space for T1 and T2 and more so in phase 2 in all three dimensions,
17
Figure 4: Distance in payoff space: P (i∗)− P (i) by phase
Notes: Kernel density function, considering only cases where c > 0; Treatment 2 P (i∗) has been computed based on objective
probabilities p.
P (i∗)− P (i), P (i∗)− P (i) and P (i∗)− P (i).
We now consider pairwise treatment comparisons based on data for 15 caseswith c > 0. Pairwise
treatment comparisons allow us to control specifically for whether p information is granted andwhich
additional data are elicited.
(a) T1↔ T2: differ in that p is known in T1 but not in T2, which also asks for pˆ, the subjectively
stated probability of a boom.
Figure 5, displaying the densities of p and pˆ for all participants of T2 separately for both phases,
reveals a dominance of wishful thinking in both phases and hardly any learning.17 Such optimism,
however, does not account for the suboptimal choices, since i∗ does not depend on p or pˆ. When we
test for differences in probabilities between T1 and T2 (see Table 14 in Appendix B) the excessive
optimism is significant (p < 0.00), which is insignificantly (p > 0.05) reduced by experience.
17In each round of T2, we allow participants to modify the stated probability once: this actually occurred 3% and 2%
of the times in phase 1 and 2, respectively.
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Figure 5: Comparison of p and pˆ for T2
Table 6: Action and payoff space comparison - T1 vs. T2
i∗ − i P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i)
T1 vs. T2 T1 T2 WRST(Ind.) T1 T2 WRST T1 T2 WRST T1 T2 WRST
All sample -0.305 -0.282 0.013(0.004) 0.076 0.070 0.056 0.063 0.043 0.000 0.075 0.069 0.049
Phase 1 -0.409 -0.369 0.427(0.409) 0.095 0.087 0.315 0.056 0.040 0.001 0.102 0.091 0.666
Phase 2 -0.201 -0.195 0.005(0.029) 0.057 0.054 0.063 0.071 0.045 0.000 0.049 0.046 0.015
KST(Ind.) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples is used to compare across treatments, and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) for the analysis across phases. The parentheses report the tests on individual averages. For
these tests, p-values are reported. In T2, P (i∗) is computed based on objective probabilities p.
Table 6 reveals a larger average deviation i∗ − i for T1 than for T2, which seems mainly due to
(significant) differences in behavior in phase 2. In the payoff dimensions P (i), P (i) and P (i), the
differences are significantly affected by phase with only P (i∗) − P (i) increasing from phase 1 to
phase 2.
(b) T1↔ T3: Participants in both treatments are aware of probability p and differ only in that
participants in T3 also have to form aspirations, which they can revise only once.
In Table 7, we restrict the comparison to aspects for which both treatments provide data. In
spite of what the overall comparisons across all treatments suggest, homogeneity of deviation from
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Table 7: Action and payoff space comparison - T1 vs. T3
i∗ − i P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i)
T1 vs. T3 T1 T3 WRST(Ind.) T1 T3 WRST T1 T3 WRST T1 T3 WRST
All sample -0.305 -0.650 0.000(0.000) 0.076 0.139 0.000 0.063 0.036 0.000 0.075 0.165 0.000
Phase 1 -0.409 -0.699 0.000(0.000) 0.087 0.150 0.000 0.056 0.036 0.000 0.102 0.177 0.000
Phase 2 -0.201 -0.600 0.000(0.000) 0.054 0.129 0.000 0.071 0.036 0.000 0.049 0.152 0.000
KST(ind.) 0.000(0.000) 0.001(0.000) 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.917 0.000 0.005
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples is used to compare across treatments, and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) for the analysis across phases. The parentheses report the tests on individual averages. For
these tests, p-values are reported.
optimality in the action and payoff space, as well as across phases, is not rejected, except for the
smaller payoff losses P (i∗)− P (i) in phase 2 of T3.
(c) T2↔ T3: Both treatments burden participants by eliciting additional choices, pˆ in the case of
T2 and A,A in the case of T3, where of course, the latter seems to be more cognitively demanding.
Table 8: Action and payoff space comparison - T2 vs. T3
i∗ − i P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i)
T2 vs. T3 T2 T3 WRST(Ind.) T2 T3 WRST T2 T3 WRST T2 T3 WRST
All sample -0.282 -0.650 0.000(0.000) 0.070 0.139 0.000 0.043 0.036 0.000 0.069 0.165 0.000
Phase 1 -0.369 -0.699 0.000(0.000) 0.087 0.150 0.000 0.040 0.036 0.000 0.091 0.177 0.000
Phase 2 -0.195 -0.600 0.000(0.000) 0.054 0.129 0.000 0.045 0.036 0.000 0.046 0.152 0.000
KST(ind.) 0.000(0.000) 0.001(0.000) 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.917 0.000 0.005
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples is used to compare across treatments, and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) for the analysis across phases. The parentheses report the tests on individual averages. For
these tests, p-values are reported. In T2, P (i∗) is computed from objective probabilities p.
Again restricting the comparison to aspects for which both treatments provide data (see Table 8),
one qualitative conclusion is that knowing p, only in T3, apparently does not help: average choice
behavior and outcomes are closer to optimality in T2, although P (i∗)− P (i) is smaller for T3 than
for T2.
(d) T1↔ T4 and T2↔ T4
All statements for T2↔ T3 apply analogously (see Tables 16 and 15 in Appendix B).
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6 Comparing Satisficing across Treatments
Let us first compare how often aspirations were adjusted: in T3, aspirations were adjusted 25% (35%)
of the time in phase 1 (phase 2), while in T4, aspirations were adjusted 35% (39%) of the time in
phase 1 (phase 2). With experience, one engages in more frequent aspiration adaptation (Sauermann
and Selten, 1962).
Table 9: Action and payoff space comparison - T3 vs. T4
i∗ − i P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i)
T3 vs. T4 T3 T4 WRST(Ind.) T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST
All sample -0.650 -0.718 0.114(0.000) 0.139 0.152 0.197 0.036 0.030 0.015 0.165 0.175 0.275
Phase 1 -0.699 -0.749 0.348(0.003) 0.150 0.161 0.131 0.036 0.035 0.613 0.177 0.185 0.488
Phase 2 -0.600 -0.688 0.207(0.041) 0.129 0.142 0.820 0.036 0.025 0.003 0.152 0.165 0.391
KST(Ind.) 0.001(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.010 0.000 0.917 0.842 0.005 0.000
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples is used to compare across treatments, and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) for the analysis across phases. The parentheses report the tests on individual averages. For
these tests, p-values are reported.
Regarding deviations from i∗ in the action and payoff space, Table 9 reveals a significant phase
effect for i∗ − i, P (i∗) − P (i) and P (i∗) − P (i) for both treatments and rejects homogeneity of
payoff deviations P (i∗)− P (i) across treatments for phase 2.
Table 10: Share and average level of satisficing
T3 T4
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) & (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 77 81 80 83
Obs 1125 1125 1065 1065
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 97 98 97 98
φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0) 0.307 0.304 0.295 0.245
s.d. 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.19
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 77 82 80 84
φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0) 0.212 0.230 0.165 0.149
s.d. 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.15
Notes: Average for 15 cases where c > 0.
Tables 10 and 11 both rely on the finally confirmed A,A aspiration profiles. Table 10 lists the
percentage share of satisficing (top row) as combined percentage shares of P (i) ≥ A and P (i) ≥ A.
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Table 11: Share and average level when P (i) < 1 and P (i) = 1
P (i) < 1 P (i) = 1
T3 T4 T3 T4
Ph. 1 Ph. 2 Ph. 1 Ph. 2 Ph. 1 Ph. 2 Ph. 1 Ph. 2
Obs. 216 242 198 181 909 883 867 884
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 86 89 86 90 100 100 100 100
φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0) 0.201 0.234 0.210 0.161 0.329 0.321 0.311 0.261
s.d. 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.19
Notes: We consider the 15 cases where c > 0. Obs. refers to the total number of choices, where P (i) < 1 and P (i) = 1, and the share
accounts for those consistent with condition P (i)−A > 0.
Satisficing is prevalent in approximately 80% of all individual choices and increases slightly with
experience. When we decompose the analysis between actual success and aspiration for boom and
doom separately (Table 10, central and bottom rows) failures are mainly caused by not meeting the
doom condition P ≥ A, probably due to P (i) < 1 rendering it more difficult to specify a numerical
visual slider cue.
To justify that failing to satisfice is due to numerically translating column heights in numerical
aspirations when they are below 1 we compare the the cases P (i) < 1 and P (i) = 1. Table 11
separates the relatively few i observations yielding P (i) < 1, where the same difficulty of P (i) < 1
arises. We conclude that, when P (i) < 1, the share of satisficing is higher than the doom cases
where P (i) < 1 (see P (i)−A ≥ 0 in Table 10).
The average distance, φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0), in Table 11 is consistently larger forP (i) = 1
than for P (i) < 1: why guaranteeing P (i) = 1, as predicted by optimality, but not aspiring it? An
interpretation could be that one aspires to a satisficingly high probability of earning more (e14),
suggesting that P (i)−A is equally large for P (i) < 1 and P (i) = 1. The fact that P (i)−A ranges
from 0.161 to 0.234 for P (i) < 1 and from 0.261 to 0.329 for P (i) = 1 supports this explanation.
The scatter plots displaying the average individual (P −A,P −A) differences in T3 and T4 in
Figure 6 suggest a positive correlation between these dimensions, specifically 0.27 (0.42) for phase
1 (phase 2) in T3 and 0.50 (0.44) for phase 1 (phase 2) in T4, which are all statistically significant.
SettingA < P (i) orA < P (i)means sacrificing the probability of earninge14 to earn onlye4,
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Figure 6: Scatter plots of individual average deviations P (i)−A and P (i)−A for T3 and T4
Notes: Individual average deviation for cases where c > 0.
which is referred to as "burningmoney",BM = max
{
P (i)−A, 0} andBM = max {P (i)−A, 0}.
In our view, burning moderate amounts reveals a general skepticism of or timidity to exploit the in-
vestment choice i. Participants seemingly do not mind sacrificing some probability of earning more
in order to compensate for slight misunderstandings or mistakes (see Güth et al., 2009, for similar
results). However, as Figure 6 reveals, "burning money" may be more than a moderate sacrifice.
Whereas "burning money" does not question satisficing, "committing suicide" via A > P (i)
in case of P (i) < 1, CS, or A > P (i), committing suicide CS, does. Figure 7 presents the
evidence of "burning money" and "committing suicide" for all data (both phases of both treatments),
as well the consequences for the chances to earn e14, where the left (right) diagram depicts boom
(doom). When the aspiration exceeds what the i choice yields, the chances to earn e14 are nil, and
when "burning money", the aspired probability becomes the actual chance of earning e14. Figure 7
clearly reveals the expected and striking preponderance of "burning money" (this is confirmed by the
kernel density plots in Figure 14 in Appendix B separately for boom (upper plots) and doom (lower
plots) as well as for T3 (left plots) and T4 (right plots). The modes are in the BM ranges with the
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Figure 7: Chances to earn e14 depending on aspirations
Notes: Pooled observations for phase 1, phase 2, Treatment 3 and Treatment 4. The probability of winning e14 is the probabilityA (left
graph) and A (right graph): these probabilities are positive when "burning money", BM respectively BM , and the probability falls to
0 for "committing suicide", CS respectively CS.
only remarkable reduction from phase 1 to phase 2 in case of BM in T4).
The top row of Table 12 shows that optimal aspiration formation is very unlikely (A = P (i) is
always below 5%, and A = P (i) is granted only twice) but more frequent in T4, as if information
about p crowds out better decision making. Table 12 also displays the expectedly high percentage
shares of BM and low CS shares, with CS being more frequent than CS.
BM and CS might be driven by neglegible errors, so we compareBM andCS across treatments
and phases by tolerating  amounts of "burning money" and "committing suicide" when smaller than
 = 0.025 (upper part of Table17 in Appendix B) and  = 0 (lower part). Compared to the average
amounts of "burning money" (φBM,φBM ) and "committing suicide" (φCS, φCS) for  = 0,
the corresponding averages for  = 0.025 are considerably larger: many deviations from optimal
aspiration formation for given i choices are beyond small margins. The striking reduction from
phase 1 to phase 2 is restricted to "committing suicide" (see Table 17 in Appendix B).
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Table 12: "Burning Money" and "Committing Suicide" if c > 0
T3 T4
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2
% P (i) = A 0.31 0.67 2.35 4.98
Observations 7 15 50 106
% P (i) = A 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00
Observations 0 2 0 0
Burning Money
Phase 1 Phase 2 KST Phase 1 Phase 2 KST
%BM 48.31 48.18 46.38 44.18
φ(BM) 0.309 0.308 0.003 0.310 0.273 0.000
s.d. 0.146 0.176 0.157 0.177
Observation 1087 1084 988 941
%BM 38.71 40.98 40.14 41.97
φ(BM) 0.212 0.231 0.271 0.165 0.149 0.070
s.d. 0.190 0.206 0.160 0.150
Observation 871 922 855 894
Committing Suicide
Phase 1 Phase 2 KST Phase 1 Phase 2 KST
%CS 1.38 1.16 1.27 0.85
φ(CS) 0.351 0.212 0.020 0.369 0.152 0.031
s.d. 0.303 0.206 0.324 0.166
Observation 31 26 27 18
%CS 11.29 8.93 9.86 8.03
φ(CS) 0.172 0.139 0.064 0.202 0.173 0.275
s.d. 0.150 0.130 0.171 0.139
Observation 254 201 210 171
Notes: The analysis refers to the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions tests between phases. Cases with c = 0 are
excluded.
7 The c = 0 cases
The c = 0 cases are important, since they allow us to compare the point and set-valued optimality
predictions differently.
• for e = 2, even generically set-valued optimal satisficing becomes a point prediction coincid-
ing with expected utility maximization;
• for e > 2, even generically unique expected utility maximization becomes set-valued, again
coinciding with optimal satisficing; and
• for e = 3 and e = 4, one can determine how the size of the optimal set affects the degree of
(non)optimal behavior.
Figure 8 and Table 13 report the choice behavior for c = 0. Figure 8 distinguishes between the
different levels of endowment (e equal to 2, 3 and 4) and lists the percentage shares of i choices
below, equal to and larger than the optimal choices. Optimality is rare when point valued (e = 2)
but predominant when set valued (e > 2). Surprisingly, optimality is less strongly supported in
treatment T1 when its set prediction is larger (e = 4 compared to e = 3). Only for treatments T3
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Table 13: Share and average level of satisficing when c = 0
T3 T4
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 84 88 89 88
φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0) 0.279 0.290 0.267 0.228
s.d. 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.20
P (i) < 1
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 65 74 75 74
φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0) 0.217 0.214 0.229 0.201
s.d. 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.18
Obs. 105 105 97 99
P (i) = 1
% of (P (i)−A ≥ 0) 100 100 100 100
φ(P (i)−A | P (i)−A ≥ 0) 0.314 0.339 0.290 0.244
s.d. 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.21
Obs. 120 120 116 114
Notes: Average for 15 cases where c > 0.
and T4 does set optimality increase significantly as the set gets larger. Percentage shares below and
above the optimality sets are, on average, quite similar.
Table 13 presents evidence of satisficing, which requires only P (i) ≥ A for c = 0 separately for
treatments T3 and T4 and for i choices yielding P (i) = 1 when satisficing cannot be violated and
P (i) < 1. In the latter case, satisficing is predominant but increasing across phases only in T3. The
average amount of "burning money", φ(P (i) − A), is larger for P (i) = 1 than for P (i) < 1 when
satisficing, corresponding to c > 0 behavior. Only for T4 "burning money" is consistently reduced
across phases.
Altogether the strongest support for optimality applies under the following conditions: expected
utility maximization and set-optimal satisficing coincide, as c = 0 renders intrapersonal payoff
aggregation irrelevant and both concepts are set valued (e > 2) rather than point valued (e = 2). In
fact, for e > 2, the shares of non-optimal investment choices lie between 5 and 10% ()see Figure 8).
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8 Conclusion
Our analysis assesses the following:
• (sub)optimality across four different between-subject treatments, T1, T2, T3 and T4; two
phases with 18 i choices each, and all 36 i choices of each individual participant; and
• (non)optimal satisficing across T3 and T4, allowing the testing of satisficing and measurement
of non-optimal satisficing via "burningmoney" and "committing suicide" separately for binary
random events, boom and doom.
Due to our focus on (sub)optimality and (non)optimal satisficing, our assessments and conclu-
sions are based on robust findings for all cases, both phases and comparable treatments. Neither
optimality concept conditions its predictions on probability. What is elicited instead, namely, pˆ
in T2 and A, as well as A in T3 and T4, might cognitively crowd out concentration on behaving
(set)optimally but does not affect the (set)optimal choice prediction, i.
Assessing and testing (sub)optimality and (non)optimal satisficing for 18 different cases with
systematically varying parameters c, e and p and varying optimal investment shares is clearly superior
to concentrating on one or two cases whose conclusions could be rather case specific.
Furthermore, optimality in choosing i, as well as in aspiration formation, requires rather weak
assumptions, namely, Assumption 1 and 2, respectively 3 to prefer e14 over e4, respectively to
maximize payoffs via repeated use of the slider alerting participants to the payoff consequences of i
choices.
Even such rather weak assumptions are systematically violated. This throughly questions ac-
counting for empirical, i.e., experimentally observed, behavior via "rationalizing" with small noise.
Neither rationality in making mistakes nor aversion concepts, of which there are several, are appli-
cable in our setup. The systematic rejection of even weak assumptions renders any rational choice
explanation an as-if explanation without any claim to be able to explain how choices are generated,
i.e., without any behavioral or, specifically, psychological appeal. Nevertheless, one could learn a
considerable amount from as if-explanations such as most of our findings; they suggest when and
28
why deviations from (set)optimality occur. To provide such a rationalization is, however, quite dif-
ficult, since many instruments are ruled out by design.
In our view, taken together, the main findings and statistical results question the view that through
consequentialist deliberations we aim at the best outcome. Participants do not generate their choices
by anticipating their expected consequences, which presupposes that they are not only fully aware
but also certain of the implications of their choice. We often seem to not trust ourselves, and we
doubt whether we mentally perceive choice tasks and assess choice consequences correctly.
Our analysis is not merely destructive. Although participants are apparently not "born satisfi-
cers", learning and advising could reduce the extent of "burning money" and "committing suicide":
suboptimality and non-optimal satisficing may be avoided or reduced when alerting participants to
their excessive losses and advising them on how to reduce these losses. Teaching and learning could
help limit suboptimality and non-optimal satisficing.
This study should not prevent us from adopting psychological approaches (except for prospect
theory and its variants) that view forward-looking consequentialist decision making as a dynamic
deliberation process (see for such a process framework, albeit very far from offering an algorithm,
Güth and Ploner, 2016), which denies exogenously given preferences and beliefs. A follow-up study
will focus on how participants have reacted to specific parameters captured by the 18 different cases,
as well as how they responded to what has been elicited in addition to the i choices. This will
hopefully provide stylized facts and some orientation when theorizing about what matters, as well
as how and when, in (experiments on) risky decision making.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we report the translated version of the instructions given to participants.
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 1 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
(Not part of Instructions: Treatment 1) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
Please, read the instructions carefully. 
 
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions. These decisions as well as 
random events will determine your earning. We will now explain the experiment and the payment 
mechanism. 
 
The experiment consists of two identical phases of 18 rounds each. At the beginning of each round 
you are endowed with an amount of money that can be allocated in two kinds of investment: 
investment A and investment B. Investment A is a risk-free bond with constant repayment factor, 
independent of the market condition; Investment B is a risky asset whose repayment factor changes 
with the market condition and the amount invested in it. 
 
The market can be in good or bad conditions whose probabilities are communicated in each round. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select a round and you will be paid for that 
round. 
Once the experiment has been completed, you will be asked to answer a questionnaire whose 
information will be strictly reserved and will be used only anonymously and for research purposes. 
 
Please, work in silence and do not disturb other participants. If you have some doubts, please, raise 
your hand and wait: one experimenter will come and help you as soon as she can. 
 
ENJOY! 
 
  
 2 
INVESTMENT CHOICE 
 
In each round you will be endowed with an amount of money (e), which varies from round to round, 
that can be allocated between investment A and investment B, by moving the cursor in the bar (see 
screenshot). Investment A has a constant repayment factor (c), independent of the market 
condition; Investment B is risky and its repayment factor changes with market condition (good or 
bad) and the amount invested: specifically, the investment in B is lost in bad market condition and 
repays only in good market condition.  
Market is in good or bad condition with known probabilities, p respectively (1-p), which will be 
communicated in each round.  
 
We will illustrate the choice task in the following example. This will help to familiarize with the 
screenshots for the investment decisions (see the figure below). 
Assume that in a given round you are endowed with e = 3. You must choose how much to invest in 
the risky asset B (i) and how much to invest in the risk-free bond A (e-i). 
The repayment factor for the risk-free bond A is 0.29 (c).  
The repayment factor for the risky asset B depends on the amount you invest (i) and on the market 
condition, good or bad, whose probabilities, in the example, are 14% (p) and 86% (1-p) respectively. 
In particular, the repayment factor of the risky investment i is (e-i) in good market condition and 0 in 
bad market condition. 
Given the endowment (in the example, e=3) and the repayment factor of the risk-free bond (in the 
example, c=0.29), your investment in the risky asset (in the example, i=1) and your investment in the 
risk-free bond (in the example, (e-i)=2) will determine your probability of earning €14 and the 
complementary probability of earning €4, which both depend on good or bad market condition, as 
will be shortly explained. 
 
Please, note that your choice will affect only the probability of earning €14 or €4. 
 
In the good market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given by the sum of repayment of the 
risk-free investment, c*(e-i), and the repayment of the risky investment, (e-i)*i. In the screenshot, the 
probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, is represented by the height of the column 
corresponding to the good market condition. In the example, given the investment choice of i=1 in 
the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability of earning €14 is approximately 80%. 
 
 3 
In the bad market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given only by the repayment of the risk-
free investment, c*(e-i). In the example, the probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, 
is represented by the height of the column corresponding to the bad market condition. In the example, 
given the investment choice of i=1 in the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability 
of earning €14 is approximately 50%. 
 
 
 
 
Before making your final decision on how much to invest in the risky asset (i) you can try and 
visualize the effects of your choice on the probability of earning €14 in the two different market 
conditions by scrolling the cursor on the bar. You have several attempts before your final one. You 
can move the cursor at most 6 times. You can, of course, confirm also an earlier try. The count of 
your attempts is shown in the centre of the screen by the number between the two columns (in the 
example, 1 try). The number in the upper right corner up, instead, shows the time elapsed in the 
current round: for each round, you have at most 60 seconds to make your final choice (in the example, 
you still have 53 seconds left). 
 
Warning: if you do not confirm your investment choice in time, your last choice before the time 
expiration will be considered. 
Your endowment    e = 3  
Probability of good market condition  p = 0.14 
Probability of bad market condition  1-p = 0.86 
Repayment factor of the risk-free bond   c = 0.29 
 
Choose how much of e you want to invest in the risky asset and in the risk-free bond by moving the cursor at the bottom. The red 
part represents the amount invested in the risky asset, the yellow part represents the amount invested in the risk-free bond. When 
releasing the mouse four probabilities bars pop up as well as a confirm button. You can move the cursor at most 6 times and must 
confirm after at most 60 seconds. 
€14 €4 
Good market condition: p = 0.14 
Investment in the risky asset 
CONFIRM 
€4 €14 
INVESTMENT PHASE 1– round 1 
Bad market condition: 1-p = 0.86 
 4 
 
YOUR EARNING IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
As already explained, in this experiment you can earn either €14 or €4. Your actual earning will 
depend on the randomly chosen payment round, on your investment decision and on the market 
condition in that round.  
In particular, at the end of the experiment the earning of €14 or €4 will be selected by the computer 
with a probability that depends on: 
1. the round randomly chosen for the final payment; 
2. your investment choice in that round; 
3. the market condition in that round (either good or bad). 
 
In addition, you will receive a show up fee of €4. 
 
The total earning will be paid individually, privately and immediately after the experiment to each 
participant.   
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
(Not part of Instructions: Treatment 2) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
Please, read the instructions carefully. 
 
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions. These decisions as well as 
random events will determine your earning. We will now explain the experiment and the payment 
mechanism. 
 
The experiment consists of two identical phases of 18 rounds each. At the beginning of each round 
you are endowed with an amount of money that can be allocated in two kinds of investment: 
investment A and investment B. Investment A is a risk-free bond with constant repayment factor, 
independent of the market condition; Investment B is a risky asset whose repayment factor changes 
with the market condition and the amount invested in it. 
 
The market can be in good or bad conditions whose probabilities are unknown. Before the investment 
choice, you will be asked to state your expectations regarding the probabilities of market in good or 
bad conditions. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select a round and you will be paid for that 
round. 
Once the experiment has been completed, you will be asked to answer a questionnaire whose 
information will be strictly reserved and will be used only anonymously and for research purposes. 
 
Please, work in silence and do not disturb other participants. If you have some doubts, please, raise 
your hand and wait: one experimenter will come and help you as soon as she can. 
 
ENJOY! 
 2 
INVESTMENT CHOICE 
 
In each round you will be endowed with an amount of money (e), which varies from round to round, 
that can be allocated between investment A and investment B, by moving the cursor in the bar (see 
screenshot). Investment A has a constant repayment factor (c), independent of the market 
condition; Investment B is risky and its repayment factor changes with market condition (good or 
bad) and the amount invested: specifically, the investment in B is lost in bad market condition and 
repays only in good market condition.  
Market is in good or bad condition with unknown probabilities. 
 
We will illustrate the choice task by the following example. This will help to familiarize with the 
screenshots for the investment decisions (see the figure below). 
Assume that in a given round you are endowed with e = 3. You must choose how much to invest in 
the risky asset B (i) and how much to invest in the risk-free bond A (e-i). 
The repayment factor for the risk-free bond A is 0.29 (c).  
The repayment factor for the risky asset B depends on the amount you invest (i) and on the market 
condition, good or bad. In particular, the repayment factor of the risky investment i is e-i in good 
market condition and 0 in bad market condition.  
Given the endowment (in the example, e=3) and the repayment factor of the risk-free bond (in the 
example, c=0.29), your investment in the risky asset (in the example, i=1) and your investment in the 
risk-free bond (in the example, (e-i)=2) will determine your probability of earning €14 and the 
complementary probability of earning €4, which both depend on good or bad market condition, as 
will be shortly explained.  
 
Please, note that your choice will affect only the probability of earning €14 or €4. 
 
In the good market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given by the sum of repayment of the 
risk-free investment, c*(e-i), and the repayment of the risky investment, (e-i)*i. In the screenshot, the 
probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, is represented by the height of the column 
corresponding to the good market condition. In the example, given the investment choice of i=1 in 
the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability of earning €14 is approximately 80%. 
 
In the bad market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given only by the repayment of the risk-
free investment, c*(e-i). In the screenshot, the probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, 
 3 
is represented by the height of the column corresponding to the bad market condition. In the example, 
given the investment choice of i=1 in the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability 
of earning €14 is approximately 50%. 
 
 
 
 
Before making your final decision on how much to invest in the risky asset (i) you can try and 
visualize the effects of your choice on the probability of earning €14 in the two different market 
conditions by scrolling the cursor on the bar. You have several attempts before your final one. You 
can move the cursor at most 6 times. You can, of course, confirm also an earlier try. The count of 
your attempts is shown in the centre of the screen by the number between the two columns (in the 
example, 1 try). The number in the upper right corner up, instead, shows the time elapsed in the 
current round: for each round, you have at most 60 seconds to make your final choice (in the example, 
you still have 53 seconds left). 
 
Warning: if you do not confirm your investment choice in time, your last choice before the time 
expiration will be considered. 
 
Your endowment    e = 3  
Repayment factor of the risk-free bond   c = 0.29 
 
Choose how much of e you want to invest in the risky asset and in the risk-free bond by moving the cursor at the bottom. The red 
part represents the amount invested in the risky asset, the yellow part represents the amount invested in the risk-free bond. When 
releasing the mouse four probabilities bars pop up as well as a confirm button. You can move the cursor at most 6 times and must 
confirm after at most 60 seconds. 
€14 €4 
Good market condition 
Investment in the risky asset 
CONFIRM 
€4 €14 
INVESTMENT PHASE 1– round 1 
Bad market condition 
I WANT TO MODIFY Pb AND Pc 
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Before the investment choice, in each round you will be asked to state your expectations about the 
market conditions. In particular, you will be asked to state your expectation regarding the market in 
good condition and the computer will automatically generate the complementary probability for the 
market in bad condition.  
 
  
 5 
STATEMENT OF THE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT MARKET CONDITIONS 
 
In each round, before your investment choice, you have to state your expectations regarding the 
probabilities of market in good or bad condition, as shown in the screenshot. 
 
When inserting the probability for good market condition, clicking on "IMPOSTA" the computer 
automatically generates the complementary probability for bad market condition. By clicking on 
“Confirm", in the lower right corner of the screen, you can then proceed with your investment choice. 
 
 
  
PROBABILITIES MARKET CONDITIONS PHASE 1 - Round 1 
State your probability for good market condition. 
The probability that the market is in bad conditions is 
CONFIRM 
 6 
YOUR EARNING IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
As already explained, in this experiment you can earn either €14 or €4. Your actual earning will 
depend on the randomly chosen payment round, on your investment decision and on the market 
condition in that round.  
In particular, at the end of the experiment the earning of €14 or €4 will be selected by the computer 
with a probability that depends on: 
1. the round randomly chosen for the final payment; 
2. your investment choice in that round; 
3. the market condition in that round (either good or bad). 
 
In addition, you will receive a show up fee of €4. 
 
The total earning will be paid individually, privately and immediately after the experiment to each 
participant.   
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
(Not part of Instructions: Treatment 3) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
Please, read the instructions carefully. 
 
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions. These decisions as well as 
random events will determine your earning. We will now explain the experiment and the payment 
mechanism. 
 
The experiment consists of two identical phases of 18 rounds each. At the beginning of each round 
you are endowed with an amount of money that can be allocated in two kinds of investment: 
investment A and investment B. Investment A is a risk-free bond with constant repayment factor, 
independent of the market condition; Investment B is a risky asset whose repayment factor changes 
with the market condition and the amount invested in it. 
 
The market can be in good or bad conditions whose probabilities are communicated in each round. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select a round and you will be paid for that 
round. 
Once the experiment has been completed, you will be asked to answer a questionnaire whose 
information will be strictly reserved and will be used only anonymously and for research purposes. 
 
Please, work in silence and do not disturb other participants. If you have some doubts, please, raise 
your hand and wait: one experimenter will come and help you as soon as she can. 
 
ENJOY! 
 
  
 2 
INVESTMENT CHOICE 
 
In each round you will be endowed with an amount of money (e), which varies from round to round, 
that can be allocated between investment A and investment B, by moving the cursor in the bar (see 
screenshot). Investment A has a constant repayment factor (c), independent of the market 
condition; Investment B is risky and its repayment factor changes with market condition (good or 
bad) and the amount invested: specifically, the investment in B is lost in bad market condition and 
repays only in good market condition.  
Market is in good or bad condition with known probabilities, p respectively (1-p), which will be 
communicated in each round.  
 
We will illustrate the choice task by the following example. This will help to familiarize with the 
screenshots for the investment decisions (see the figure below). 
Assume that in a given round you are endowed with e = 3. You must choose how much to invest in 
the risky asset B (i) and how much to invest in the risk-free bond A (e-i). 
The repayment factor for the risk-free bond A is 0.29 (c).  
The repayment factor for the risky asset B depends on the amount you invest (i) and on the market 
condition, good or bad, whose probabilities, in the example, are 14% (p) and 86% (1-p) respectively. 
In particular, the repayment factor of the risky investment i is (e-i) in good market condition and 0 in 
bad market condition.  
Given the endowment (in the example, e=3) and the repayment factor of the risk-free bond (in the 
example, c=0.29), your investment in the risky asset (in the example, i=1) and your investment in the 
risk-free bond (in the example, (e-i)=2) will determine your probability of earning €14 and the 
complementary probability of earning €4, which both depend on good or bad market condition, as 
will be shortly explained. 
 
Please, note that your choice will affect only the probability of earning €14 or €4. 
 
In the good market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given by the sum of repayment of the 
risk-free investment, c*(e-i), and the repayment of the risky investment, (e-i)*i. In the screenshot, the 
probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, is represented by the height of the column 
corresponding to the good market condition. In the example, given the investment choice of i=1 in 
the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability of earning €14 is approximately 80%. 
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In the bad market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given only by the repayment of the risk-
free investment, c*(e-i). In the example, the probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, 
is represented by the height of the column corresponding to the bad market condition. In the example, 
given the investment choice of i=1 in the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability 
of earning €14 is approximately 50%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Before making your final decision on how much to invest in the risky asset (i) you can try and 
visualize the effects of your choice on the probability of earning €14 in the two different market 
conditions by scrolling the cursor on the bar. You have several attempts before your final one. You 
can move the cursor at most 6 times. You can, of course, confirm also an earlier try. The count of 
your attempts is shown in the centre of the screen by the number between the two columns (in the 
example, 1 try). The number in the upper right corner up, instead, shows the time elapsed in the 
current round: for each round, you have at most 60 seconds to make your final choice (in the example, 
you still have 53 seconds left). 
 
Warning: if you do not confirm your investment choice in time, your last choice before the time 
expiration will be considered. 
 
I want to modify Psb and Psc 
 4 
Before the investment choice, in each round you will be asked to state the probability of earning €14 
instead of €4 that would make you satisfied, both for market in good and bad condition separately. 
You will earn €14 with the probability that makes you satisfied if the probability implied by your 
investment choice i (the height of €14-column in the screenshot) is not smaller than the probability 
that makes you satisfied (in the screenshot your stated satisficing probability is shown by the 
horizontal line). On the contrary, if the probability implied by your investment choice i (the height of 
the €14-column in the screenshot) is smaller than the probability that makes you satisfied, you will 
earn €14 with 0% probability. 
 
 5 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBABILITY OF EARNING €14 THAT MAKES YOU 
SATISFIED  
 
In each round, before your investment choice, you will have to state the probability of earning €14 
instead of €4 that would make you satisfied for both markets in good condition (Psb) and in bad 
condition (Psc), separately. 
Warning: the probability that makes you satisfied for the market in good condition cannot be 
smaller than the probability for the market in bad condition. 
In the example below Psb is set at 60% and Psc is set at 50%. 
 
  
 
By clicking on "Confirm", in the lower right corner of the screen, you can then proceed with your 
investment choice. 
 
Warning: you can modify the probability that makes you satisfied only once, by clicking on the 
button “I want to modify Psb and Psc”. 
 
  
60 
50 
in good  market condition I would be satisfied 
by the probability of  
in bad  market condition I would be satisfied 
by the probability of  
State the probability of earning €14 instead of €4 that would make you satisfied (be aware that the probability for 
market in good condition cannot be smaller than the probability for market in bad condition) 
 
Satisficing probabilities 
CONFIRM 
 6 
YOUR EARNING IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
As already explained, in this experiment you can earn either €14 or €4. Your actual earning will 
depend on the randomly chosen payment round, on your investment decision and on the market 
condition in that round and on your stated aspiration levels.  
In particular, at the end of the experiment the earning of €14 or €4 will be selected by the computer 
with a probability that depends on: 
1. the round randomly chosen for the final payment; 
2. your investment choice in that round; 
3. the market condition in that round (either good or bad); 
4. whether the probability of earning €14 that makes you satisfied is achieved in the following way: 
 
a) If the probability of earning €14 that makes you satisfied is achieved, the probability of 
earning €14 is equal to your satisficing probability for the market condition of the round 
randomly chosen. 
In the example, the market in good condition and the investment choice i=1 determine a 
probability of 80% of earning €14. Since the stated satisficing probability for the market in 
good condition is 60%, the result is the following: 
- You achieved the stated satisficing probability of 60%; 
- You earn €14 with probability 60% and €4 with probability 40%. 
 
 b) If the probability of earning €14 that makes you satisfied is not achieved, the probability of 
earning €14 is 0%. 
In the example, in case of market in bad condition and the investment choice i=1, the result is 
the following:  
- You earn €14 with probability 0%, which means that you earn €4 with probability 100%. 
 
In addition, you will receive a show up fee of €4. 
 
The total earning will be paid individually, privately and immediately after the experiment to each 
participant.   
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
(Not part of Instructions: Treatment 4) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
Please, read the instructions carefully. 
 
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions. These decisions as well as 
random events will determine your earning. We will now explain the experiment and the payment 
mechanism. 
 
The experiment consists of two identical phases of 18 rounds each. At the beginning of each round 
you are endowed with an amount of money that can be allocated in two kinds of investment: 
investment A and investment B. Investment A is a risk-free bond with constant repayment factor, 
independent of the market condition; Investment B is a risky asset whose repayment factor changes 
with the market condition and the amount invested in it. 
 
The market can be in good or bad conditions whose probabilities are unknown. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select a round and you will be paid for that 
round. 
Once the experiment has been completed, you will be asked to answer a questionnaire whose 
information will be strictly reserved and will be used only anonymously and for research purposes. 
 
Please, work in silence and do not disturb other participants. If you have some doubts, please, raise 
your hand and wait: one experimenter will come and help you as soon as she can. 
 
ENJOY! 
 
  
 2 
INVESTMENT CHOICE 
 
In each round you will be endowed with an amount of money (e), which varies from round to round, 
that must be allocated between investment A and investment B, by moving the cursor in the bar (see 
screenshot). Investment A has a constant repayment factor (c), independent of the market 
condition; Investment B is risky and its repayment factor changes with market condition (good or 
bad) and the amount invested: specifically, the investment in B is lost in bad market condition and 
repays only in good market condition.  
Market is in good or bad condition with unknown probabilities. 
We will illustrate the choice task by an example. This will help to familiarize with the screenshots 
for the investment decisions (see the figure below). 
Assume that in a given round you are endowed with e=3. You must choose how much to invest in 
the risky asset B (i) and how much to invest in the risk-free bond A (e-i). 
The repayment factor for the risk-free bond A is 0.29 (c).  
The repayment for the risky asset B depends on the amount you invest (i) and on the market condition, 
good or bad. In particular, the repayment factor of the risky investment i is e-i in good market 
condition and 0 in bad market condition.  
Given the endowment (in the example, 3) and the repayment factor of the risk-free bond (in the 
example, 0.29), your investment in the risky asset (i) and your investment in the risk-free bond (e-i) 
will determine your probability of earning €14 and the complementary probability of earning €4, 
which both depend on good or bad market condition.  
 
Please, note that your choice will affect only the probability of earning €14 or €4. 
 
In the good market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given by the sum of repayment of the 
risk-free investment, c*(e-i), and the repayment of the risky investment, (e-i)*i. In the screenshot, the 
probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, is represented by the height of the column 
corresponding to the good market condition. In the example, given the investment choice of i=1 in 
the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability of earning €14 is approximately 80%. 
 
In the bad market condition, the probability of earning €14 is given only by the repayment of the risk-
free investment, c*(e-i). In the example, the probability of earning €14, calculated by the computer, 
is represented by the height of the column corresponding to the bad market condition. In the example, 
 3 
given the investment choice of i=1 in the risky asset and (e-i)=2 in the risk-free bond, the probability 
of earning €14 is approximately 50%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before making your final decision on how much to invest in the risky asset (i) you can try and 
visualize the effects of your choice on the probability of earning €14 in the two different market 
conditions by scrolling the cursor on the bar. You have several attempts before your final one. You 
can move the cursor at most 6 times. You can, of course, confirm also an earlier try. The count of 
your attempts is shown in the centre of the screen by the number between the two columns (in the 
example, 1 try). The number in the upper right corner up, instead, shows the time elapsed in the 
current round: for each round, you have at most 60 seconds to make your final choice (in the example, 
you still have 53 seconds left). 
 
Warning: if you do not confirm your investment choice in time, your last choice before the time 
expiration will be considered. 
 
Before the investment choice, in each round you will be asked to state the probability of earning €14 
instead of €4 that would make you satisfied, both for market in good and bad condition separately. 
I want to modify Psb and Psc 
 4 
You will earn €14 with the probability that makes you satisfied if the probability implied by your 
investment choice i (the height of €14-column in the screenshot) is not smaller than the probability 
that makes you satisfied (in the screenshot your stated satisficing probability is shown by the 
horizontal line). On the contrary, if the probability implied by your investment choice i (the height of 
the €14-column in the screenshot) is smaller than the probability that makes you satisfied, you will 
earn €14 with 0% probability. 
 
 
 5 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBABILITY OF EARNING €14 THAT MAKES YOU 
SATISFIED  
 
In each round, before your investment choice, you will have to state the probability of earning €14 
instead of €4 that would make you satisfied for both markets in good condition (Psb) and in bad 
condition (Psc), separately. 
Warning: the probability that makes you satisfied for the market in good condition cannot be 
smaller than the probability for the market in bad condition. 
In the example below Psb is set at 60% and Psc is set at 50%. 
 
  
 
By clicking on "Confirm", in the lower right corner of the screen, you can then proceed with your 
investment choice. 
 
Warning: you can modify the probability that makes you satisfied only once, by clicking on the 
button “I want to modify Psb and Psc”. 
 
  
60 
50 
in good  market condition I would be satisfied 
by the probability of  
in bad  market condition I would be satisfied 
by the probability of  
State the probability of earning €14 instead of €4 that would make you satisfied (be aware that the probability for 
market in good condition cannot be smaller than the probability for market in bad condition) 
 
Satisficing probabilities 
CONFIRM 
 6 
YOUR EARNING IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
As already explained, in this experiment you can earn either €14 or €4. Your actual earning will 
depend on the randomly chosen payment round, on your investment decision and on the market 
condition in that round.  
In particular, at the end of the experiment the earning of €14 or €4 will be selected by the computer 
with a probability that depends on: 
1. the round randomly chosen for the final payment; 
2. your investment choice in that round; 
3. the market condition in that round (either good or bad); 
4. whether the probability of earning €14 that makes you satisfied is achieved in the following way: 
 
a) If the probability of earning €14 that makes you satisfied is achieved, the probability of 
earning €14 is equal to your satisficing probability for the market condition of the round 
randomly chosen. 
In the example, the market in good condition and the investment choice i=1 determine a 
probability of 80% of earning €14. Since the stated satisficing probability for the market in 
good condition is 60%, the result is the following: 
- You achieved the stated satisficing probability of 60%; 
- You earn €14 with probability 60% and €4 with probability 40%. 
 
 b) If the probability of earning €14 that makes you satisfied is not achieved, the probability of 
earning €14 is 0%. 
In the example, in case of market in bad condition and the investment choice i=1, the result is 
the following:  
- You earn €14 with probability 0%, which means that you earn €4 with probability 100%. 
 
In addition, you will receive a show up fee of €4. 
 
The total earning will be paid individually, privately and immediately after the experiment to each 
participant.   
 
 
 
Appendix B
Figure 9: Investment choice in the experiment
Figure 10: Investment choice in the experiment
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Figure 11: Deviation i◦ − i by Phase
Notes: Kernel density function for cases where c > 0; Treatment 2 investment i◦ has been computed based on objective probabilities
p.
Figure 12: Distance in payoff space: P (i∗)− P (i) by phase (boom cases)
Notes: Kernel density function considering only cases where c > 0.
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Figure 13: Distance in payoff space: P (i∗)− P (i) by phase (doom cases)
Notes: Kernel density function considering only cases where c > 0.
Table 14: Difference tests for probability p and probability pˆ and payoff space deviation - T1 vs. T2
T1 vs. T2
p in T1 pˆ in T2 WRST Ho: Prob(T1) = Prob(T2)
Phase 1 0.289 0.555 0.00
Phase 2 0.289 0.539 0.00
WRST Ho: Prob(Ph1) = Prob(Ph2) 1.00 0.08
Notes: The analysis refers to Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples.
Table 15: Action and payoff space comparison - T1 vs. T4
i∗ − i P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i)
T1 vs. T4 T1 T4 WRST(Ind.) T1 T4 WRST T1 T4 WRST T1 T4 WRST
All sample -0.305 -0.718 0.000(0.000) 0.076 0.152 0.000 0.063 0.030 0.000 0.075 0.175 0.000
Phase 1 -0.409 -0.749 0.000(0.000) 0.095 0.161 0.000 0.056 0.035 0.000 0.102 0.185 0.000
Phase 2 -0.201 -0.688 0.000(0.000) 0.057 0.142 0.000 0.071 0.025 0.000 0.049 0.165 0.000
KST(Ind.) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.842 0.000 0.000
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples was performed for comparison across treatments, and a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) was performed for the analysis across phases. We report the tests for individual
averages in parentheses. For these tests, p-values are reported.
58
Table 16: Action and payoff space comparison - T2 vs. T4
i∗ − i P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i) P (i∗)− P (i)
T2 vs. T4 T2 T4 WRST(Ind.) T2 T4 WRST T2 T4 WRST T2 T4 WRST
All sample -0.282 -0.718 0.000(0.000) 0.070 0.152 0.000 0.043 0.030 0.000 0.069 0.175 0.000
Phase 1 -0.369 -0.749 0.000(0.000) 0.087 0.161 0.000 0.040 0.035 0.000 0.091 0.185 0.000
Phase 2 -0.195 -0.688 0.000(0.000) 0.054 0.142 0.000 0.045 0.025 0.000 0.046 0.165 0.000
KST(Ind.) 0.000(0.000) 0.000(0.000) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.842 0.000 0.000
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples was performed for comparison across treatments, and a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) was performed for the analysis across phases. We report the tests for individual
averages in parentheses. For these tests, p-values are reported. In T2, P (i∗) is computed by objective probabilities p.
Figure 14: Deviations from optimal aspirations P (i) − A for given i choices and P (i) − A by
Treatment
Notes:Kernel density function.
Table 17: BM and CS comparison - T3 vs. T4
BM BM CS CS
T3 vs. T4 T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST
Phase 1 0.318 0.326 0.343 0.272 0.226 0.000 0.401 0.493 0.237 0.226 0.239 0.823
Obs. 1055 936 663 594 27 20 188 175
Phase 2 0.322 0.315 0.932 0.291 0.213 0.000 0.282 0.239 0.846 0.198 0.216 0.248
Obs. 1031 806 714 591 19 11 136 134
KST 0.022 0.005 0.264 0.366 0.112 0.022 0.144 0.526
T3 vs. T4 T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST T3 T4 WRST
BM BM CS CS
Phase 1 0.309 0.310 0.974 0.212 0.165 0.000 0.351 0.369 0.932 0.172 0.202 0.060
Obs. 1087 988 871 855 31 27 254 210
Phase 2 0.308 0.273 0.000 0.231 0.149 0.000 0.212 0.152 0.390 0.139 0.173 0.015
Obs. 1085 941 922 864 26 18 201 171
KST 0.003 0.000 0.271 0.070 0.020 0.031 0.064 0.275
Notes: A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRST) for two independent samples was performed for comparison across treatments, and a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of distributions test (KST) was performed for the analysis across phases. Cases with c = 0 are excluded.
The first part of the table considers the misspecification , while the second part does not.
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